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The long and winding road that is Calloway v. City of Reno' began on
October 30, 1989, when 164 townhouse owners in the Huffaker Hills develop-
ment in Reno, Nevada, filed a class action lawsuit in the Second Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Washoe County.2 The homeowners alleged that their homes were
built with defective framing, causing extensive rain and snow damage.3
Although the original suit named Offenhauser Development Company, High-
land Construction, Inc., and Sparks Roofing and Siding as defendants,4 a series
of amended complaints added the City of Reno and various other subcontrac-
tors to the litigation.5 The homeowners made their claim against the City for
negligent inspection of the houses, and filed against the subcontractors under
warranty and tort.6
The homeowners settled their claims against Offenhauser and Highland,
and the court dismissed the claims of sixty-five of the homeowners based on
statutes of repose.7 The court also dismissed all the strict liability and negli-
gence claims made by the plaintiffs, citing the doctrine of pure economic loss.8
The homeowners then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which, on
May 22, 1997, held that the district court improperly applied the economic loss
doctrine to the negligence claims.9 The City of Reno and the subcontractors
petitioned the court for a rehearing which the court granted, withdrawing its
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I The full title of the case is Charles Calloway and Marlene lacometti, on behalf of them-
selves and other property owners of Huffaker Hills Units 3 and 4 Homeowners' Association
vs. City of Reno, P & H Construction, Clarence Poehland, John Carl Construction Com-
pany, Highland Construction, Inc., and Offenhauser Development Company. This case note,
for obvious reasons, will hereafter use Calloway v. Reno.
2 Calloway v. Reno, 939 P.2d 1020 (Nev. 1997). This is the first opinion that the Supreme
Court offered on the case. It is designated in the body of this text as Calloway I.
3 Id. at 1022.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1023.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 569.
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opinion on December 3, 1998.10 On February 29, 2000, the court issued a new
ruling, affirming the original district court holding on economic loss doctrine
and rejecting the homeowners' negligence and strict liability claims.'"
In Calloway I the court held that Nevada plaintiffs could sue in tort for
grievances that were described as strictly economic in nature. 12 By withdraw-
ing that opinion and replacing it with Calloway II, the court held that economic
loss doctrine precluded negligence claims in construction defect cases. 3 In
doing so, the court removed an important remedy for aggrieved homeowners
and threw another line of cases involving municipal liability for negligent
inspection into question. 14
On April 20, 2000, the homeowners petitioned for yet another rehearing,15
and the Nevada Supreme Court's denial of that request finally brought the Cal-
loway odyssey to an end.' 6 This lengthy litigation leaves Nevada construction
defect law in turmoil. The law prior to Calloway was uncertain, at best. Con-
tractors, designers, subcontractors, and homeowners all hung in limbo as the
Nevada Supreme Court took conflicting directions in its economic loss rulings.
This note will examine the Nevada Supreme Court's treatment of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine in construction defect cases, and contrast its Calloway
decisions with trends toward greater consumer protection in both Nevada law
and the case law of other states. This note argues that Calloway II relied incor-
rectly upon the rule of economic loss.' 7 Applying economic loss doctrine to
physical property damages in construction defect cases ignores the modem
reality that homes are more like mass manufactured products than one-of-a-
kind entities.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
When and how to invoke the economic loss doctrine is a particularly
pressing problem for Nevada.' 8 The recent and sizable influx of residents into
the state has caused an explosion in home construction in Nevada. In 1996,
20,000 new homes were sold in Las Vegas, approximately fifty-five per day,
'o Calloway v. Reno, 993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000). This is the second opinion offered by the
Nevada Supreme Court in the case and is designated hereafter as Calloway 11.
I Ild.
12 Calloway 1, 939 P.2d at 1020.
"3 The Court also upheld the district court's ruling that houses are not "products" for pur-
poses of product liability law, barring appellants use of strict liability. Calloway II, 993 P.2d
at 1261.
14 See infra, note 111.
'" Appellants Petition for Rehearing No. 25628 (April 20, 2000).
16 James Beasley, Calloway and NRS 40.600: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 9 NEVADA
LAWYER 10 (Feb. 2001).
17 The case, in the author's opinion and as argued infra, was also wrongly decided on the
issue of municipal liability for knowingly approving negligent construction.
'8 Nevada led the nation with a fifty-one percent growth rate in the 1990's. Experts predict
a continued growth rate of thirty-three percent over the next decade, boosting a state popula-
tion that has reached two million within the last year to two point six million by the end of
the next decade. Sean Whaley, Nevada Population Hits 2 Million, LAS VEGAS REVIEW
JOURNAL, July 25, 2000, at Al.
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with 50 percent of those homes being planned developments.' 9 In 1997, almost
19,000 single family and 11,200 multi-unit residences were being built on 1996
permits. 2' This demand in the housing market has contributed to an almost
inevitable trend towards hastily - and sometimes shoddily - built housing. 1
During this building boom, the case of Calloway v. Reno wound its way
through the Nevada courts over a period of eleven years, with the final result in
the case hinging on the Nevada Supreme Court's approach to the economic loss
rule and its applicability to Nevada's unique home-building environment.
A. The Economic Loss Doctrine
The economic loss doctrine arose in the nineteenth century as a means to
resolve conflicts, perceived or real, between contract and tort theories.22 At
that time, contract law was thought to enforce expectancy interests created by a
specific agreement between parties who were said to be in privity.23 Tort law,
on the other hand, was designed to protect all citizens from physical harm to
person or property without regard for contractual duty. 24 Tort law imposed a
duty arising out of law, while the duty of contract law was limited to the poten-
tial liability specifically agreed upon by the contracting parties.2 5
At its inception, the economic loss doctrine prohibited the recovery of
damages in tort for product defects when the defect had not caused personal
injury or damages to property other than the manufacturer's work itself.26
When only the work product itself was damaged as a result of its defective
nature, the damage was defined as "economic" rather than as "property dam-
age," and was not recoverable in tort.27 Economic losses also included the
diminution in value of an item due to its defective nature and the consequent
loss of use or lost profits.28
In the privity view, as expressed in the South Carolina case of Carolina
Winds v. Joe Harden, loss in a construction defect case was not caused by a
contractor's failure to conform to a standard of care imposed by law, but rather
to a standard imposed by contract.2 9 Carolina Winds involved homeowners in
a planned community who sued their contractor and subcontractors for negli-
gent construction and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for intended
19 Andree J. B. Swanson, Las Vegas: Boom Town for Construction Defect Litigation, 5
NEVADA LAWYER 15 (Dec. 1997).
20 Id. at 16.
21 Id. at 15. See also Aas v. San Diego, 12 P.3d 1125, 1157 (Cal. 2000) (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing) ("It appears, moreover, that cutting corners is a prevailing problem in the development
industry.").
22 Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A
Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 897-98 (1989).
23 Id. at 892.
24 Id. at 901.
25 Id. at 901-02.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 896.
28 Id. at 895.
29 Carolina Winds Owners Association v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 897 (S.C.
1988).
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use.3" The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied relief against the contractor
on the warranty claim, holding that warranty claims arise from the sale and
must be pursued only against defendants with whom the plaintiff is in privity of
contract.3 ' The court also denied the negligence claim, citing the doctrine of
economic loss. 32 The court found that the plaintiffs were, in effect, asking the
defendant to be held liable for property damage that might cause physical dam-
age at a later date.33 The court held that allowing a tort claim for property
damage on the grounds that property damage might cause physical harm in the
future would not fulfill the tort requirement of actual damage.34 This would, in
the court's opinion, present difficulties in determining the amount of damage
that had yet to occurred, and would require a potential defendant to become an
insurer of all risks.35
Courts have also held that tort liability without privity would result in
essentially unlimited liability for negligent acts. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven and Co., Judge Cardozo distinguished between the duties owed
those with whom an accountant was in privity of contract and those owed to
third parties:
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to make their certifi-
cate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make it with the care and
caution proper to their calling .... To creditors and investors to whom the employer
exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud
.... A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty to these to
make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries,
may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indetermi-
nate time to an indeterminate class. 3 6
In Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co. ,37 the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to
grant lost wages to a factory worker who sued the party whose negligence
caused a factory to bum. 38 The court held that recovery of these consequential
economic losses was restricted to those with whom the tortfeasor was in privity
of contract.
39
Courts applying the economic loss doctrine often cite foreseeability of
damages as a primary reason to apply the doctrine. This position invokes the
well-known contract principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, that a contractor is lia-
ble only for those damages that can be reasonably foreseen by the parties.4 0
Since it is virtually impossible to predict the economic consequences of a given
act, many courts hold that allowing recovery for consequential losses, such as
30 Id.
31 Id. at 901.
32 See generally id. at 901-05.
33 Id. at 905-06.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 905.
36 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (emphasis added).
37 The heading of the case report lists the plaintiff as Stevison, but the body of the decision
refers to the plaintiff as Stevinson. Economic Loss and citing court cases refer to the plain-
tiff as Stevenson.
38 Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio 1946).
39 Id.
I Hadley v Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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lost wages and opportunities, would result in unacceptable, open-ended
liability.4 1
Against this backdrop, the economic loss doctrine arose largely in reaction
to the holding in Macpherson v. Buick Motor Company, in which a New York
court held Buick liable to third party purchasers for damage caused by a defec-
tive automobile wheel.42 Judge Cardozo held that a manufacturer may be held
liable in tort for any damage caused by an article that would be dangerous if
defectively made.43 Courts reacted to what was perceived as Macpherson's
expansion of tort liability to third parties by restricting that liability to personal
injury and requiring foreseeability. 4 However a recent trend towards greater
protection for consumers has invigorated challenges to the rule of economic
loss in construction defect cases. Courts have cited a changing demographic
landscape, where homes are frequently mass manufactured and consumers are
less able to protect themselves, as reasons to allow tort liability in some con-
struction defect cases.
In South Carolina, the Carolina Winds case was overruled by Kennedy v.
Columbia Lumber and Manufacturing.4 ' There, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that Carolina Winds was "repugnant to South Carolina's policy
of protecting the new home buyer," and refused to protect builders that built
defective housing based on "the imposition of traditional and technical legal
distinctions."4 6
State courts in New York and Texas joined the trend towards citing public
policy reasons for rejecting the technical restrictions of economic loss. 47 These
courts found inequity in allowing recovery for personal injury while denying
such a recovery for physical damage to property, including the defective prod-
uct itself.
In Dudley v. Drott Manufacturing, a crane collapsed due to defective bolts
in the crane.48 Under traditional economic loss theory, recovery would not be
allowed in tort because the crane had injured only itself. The court expressed
its support for protection of consumers, citing the technological nature of
today's society, and held that manufacturers were in a superior position to rec-
ognize and cure defects.49 The court rejected the defendant's argument that
recovery was available only if the crane damaged other property, but not for
damage to the crane itself.50 Considerations of public policy, wrote the court,
41 See Barrett, supra note 22, at 898.
42 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
43 Id. at 1053.
44 See Barrett, supra note 22, at 906-09. Barrett points out that Macpherson's elimination
of the lack of privity defense did not actually extend liability beyond existing tort principles
and, as such, should not have been interpreted to impose liability for a type of loss that was
not previously recoverable.
45 384 S.E.2d 730, 734 (S.C. 1989).
46 Id. at 735.
47 See Dudley v. Drott Manufacturing, 66 A.D.2d 368 (N.Y. 1979); see also Nobility
Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
48 66 A.D.2d 368 (N.Y. 1979).
49 Id. at 372.
50 Id. at 371.
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would favor recovery for damage to the crane as much as they would for the
damage to other property."'
The Supreme Court of Texas rejected privity as a prerequisite to seeking
recovery of economic loss in a case that directly addressed the special circum-
stances of home construction. In Nobility Homes v. Shivers, John Shivers
bought a mobile home from a retailer that he alleged was negligently con-
structed.5" He sued the manufacturer, Nobility Homes, rather than the retailer
with whom he was in privity of contract.5 3 The court did not find that the
defect made the home unreasonably dangerous or that it caused physical harm
to Shivers, but still held Nobility Homes liable for economic loss in common
law negligence, despite the lack of privity.54 The Nobility Homes Court held
that:
Economic loss can be as disastrous as physical injury .... Today, a consumer,
without regard to privity, can recover against a manufacturer whose defective product
causes the consumer to suffer the slightest physical injury. It would be inconsistent
to demand privity as a prerequisite to the same consumer's recovery against a manu-
facturer whose defective product causes the consumer to lose his entire life
savings.
55
B. California and Economic Loss
Perhaps no state's judiciary has been more active in economic loss theory
than that of California. It is said that anything that happens in California inevi-
tably migrates to Nevada, and, in fact, California construction defect attorneys
are currently relocating to Nevada to join the lawsuit explosion.5 6 The Callo-
way II opinion purports to follow the California case of Seely v. White
Motors.5 7 Given that Seely is the leading California case on the subject, 58 it is
instructive to examine Seely and its progeny to better understand the Calloway
holding.
In Seely, California joined the previously mentioned state courts in elimi-
nating the privity distinction and took this development one step further by
holding that damage to the defective product itself, without other property dam-
age, was recoverable in tort. 5 9 In Seely, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a
truck he had purchased for business use. 60 He complained that the truck "gal-
loped," causing an accident in which the truck was damaged but no person or
51 Id.
52 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
53 Id. at 78.
54 Id. at 81.
55 Id.
56 Timothy S. Menter & Matthew W. Argue, The Economic Loss Rule & Construction
Defect Litigation, 8 NEVADA LAWYER 18 (Sept. 2000). See also Michael M. Edwards, Jr.,
Mara E. Fortin, & David S. Kahn, A Defense Perspective to Construction Defect Litigation
and the Upcoming Legislative Session, 9 NEVADA LAWYER 30 (Jan. 2001) for statistics on
the increase in construction defect lawsuits.
"7 Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1264 (citing Seely v. White Motors, 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
58 One California court has referred to Seely as "the progenitor of the economic loss rule
.... Stearman v. Centex, 78 Cal. App. 4th 611, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
'9 Seely, 403 P.2d at 152.
60 Id. at 147-48.
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other property was injured.6 He sued for damages unrelated to the accident, as
well as for the money he had paid towards the purchase price of the truck and
for profits lost due to the truck's malfunction.62
The court found for the plaintiff on his breach of warranty claims, but held
that the truck's "galloping" had not caused the accident.6 3 Reiterating the eco-
nomic loss doctrine proposition that, in actions for negligence, liability is lim-
ited to damages for actual physical injury, the court dismissed the plaintiffs
claim for consequential damages.'
The court then departed from the previously established doctrine that
recovery is limited to damage of property other than the defective product
itself. The court adopted the plaintiffs contention that strict liability in tort
should be applied to physical injury to his property, as well as personal
injury.65 In arriving at that conclusion, the court reasoned that "physical injury
to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason to distinguish
them."6 6
California courts have generally (though not universally) followed the
Seely position that recovery for property damage - even that done to the defec-
tive product itself - is not precluded by the economic loss doctrine. In Huang
v. Garner, the court drew a distinction between defects in the product that had
not caused any physical damage and those that had.67 The cost of repairing
insufficient shear walls and insufficient fire retardation was economic damage,
but physical damage to property and personal injury was not economic lOSS. 68
In Transwestern Pipeline v. Monsanto, plaintiff claimed that defendant
had sent natural gas containing PCB's through plaintiffs pipes. 69 The court
distinguished between potential and actual damage, and held that plaintiff had
suffered only economic damages because, while plaintiff did incur expense in
cleaning the pipes, the "pipes still piped, the pumps still pumped, and the
meters still metered as well as they had before."7 ° However, the court made it
clear that, had plaintiff Transwestern suffered actual damage to the pipe from
defendant Monsanto's actions, the loss would have been recoverable in tort.7 1
Other cases following Seely's view on tort liability for damage to the defective
product itself include: Sacramento Regional Transit v. Grumman,72 Aris Heli-
61 Id. at 147.
62 Id. at 148.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 151.
65 Id. at 152.
66 Id.
67 Huang v. Gamer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
68 Id.
69 46 Cal. App. 4th 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
70 Id. at 524.
71 See id. at 523-24.
72 158 Cal. App. 3d. 289, 293 (Cal Ct. App. 1984): "Liability is imposed not only where the
defective product causes personal injury, but also where the defective product causes physi-
cal damages to property .... The damaged property may consist of the product itself." The
court did refuse to grant damages to plaintiff but did not deny the Seely damage rule; it
instead held that the defective bus parts complained of had caused no actual damage and the
issue was thus best dealt with in warranty. Id.
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copters, Ltd. v. Allison Gas Turbines,73 G.W. Anthony v. Kelsey- Hayes,74 and
Aas v. San Diego. 
7 5
In contrast, the California Fourth District Court of Appeals held in Zamora
v. Shell Oil that Seely and its progeny preclude a negligence cause of action
based solely on damage caused to the defective product.76 While the Seely
Court did deny the plaintiff recovery for damage to his truck, that denial was
not because economic loss doctrine forbade such a recovery. After specifically
holding that strict liability in tort should be extended to govern physical injury
to plaintiffs property, the court wrote, "[i]n this case ... there was no proof
that the defect caused physical damage to the truck."' 7 7 Given that the court
was willing to grant recovery for damage to the truck if that damage had been
caused by a defect in the truck, the Zamora court's holding was an illogical
reading of Seely, though it was a conclusion shared by the Nevada Supreme
Court in Calloway H.
Further adding to the confusion, the United States Supreme Court quoted
Seely in East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delava178 when it denied recov-
ery for damage to turbines that caused damage only to the turbines themselves.
The Court claimed that Seely's holding denied tort liability if the defective
product caused only monetary harm. 79 However, the East River Court failed to
recognize that Seely distinguished between the damage caused by failure of the
product to do what the manufacturer intended and the failure of the product to
fulfill the economic role that the purchaser desired.8 ° The Seely holding did
not completely deny tort liability if the product caused only economic harm;
rather, it denied tort liability only for harm that could not reasonably be
imputed to the manufacturer.8 1
This misinterpretation of Seely was addressed in Stearman v. Centex.8 2 In
Stearman, the plaintiffs sought recovery for damages caused to their homes by
defective foundations that were laid by the defendant.8 3 The California Fourth
District Court of Appeals (the same court that decided Zamora) addressed the
73 932 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Under California law property damage for damage to the
product itself may be recovered in a strict liability action.").
74 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 446-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). The court denied the plaintiff's claim,
holding that the damages sought were consequential and not incidental to physical property
damage, writing that "Unless incidental to physical property damage it would appear that it
may be properly classified as a type of economic loss." Id.
75 12 P.3d 1125, 1133 (Cal. 2000). Plaintiffs appealed an evidentiary ruling in a construc-
tion defect case that forbid them from introducing evidence of construction defects that had
not caused property damage. Like the Sacramento Court, the Aas Court made the distinction
between defects that had not caused actual damage and those that had.
76 Zamora v. Shell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 204, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
77 Seely, 403 P.2d at 152.
78 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
79 Id. at 868. The East River case was an admiralty case, and, as such, the case does not
control land-based decisions. Aris Helicopters, 932 F.2d at 827. The Aris court opined that
the Supreme Court had given Seely a broader reading than its holding and found that "Seely
did hold that an 'economic loss' is not a loss recoverable in strict liability, but Seely did not
hold that damage to the product alone is such an 'economic loss.'" Id.
80 Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 151.
81 See generally id. at 151-52.
82 78 Cal. App. 4th 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
83 Id. at 613.
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defendant's assertion that the claims were barred by the economic loss rule of
Seely.84 The Stearman court held that the defendant's position was unsup-
ported by Seely. 85 The court ruled that Seely distinguished between tort recov-
ery for physical injury and warranty recovery for economic loss, 8 6 and that the
defendant was "U]ust plain wrong in contending the physical damage to plain-
tiffs' real property caused by defective construction of the foundation is only
'an injury to the product itself and thus barred by the economic loss rule of
Seely." 8
7
Most recently, the California Supreme Court affirmed that Seely allowed
for recovery in negligence for damage caused to an object by a manufacturing
defect in that object.88 It also affirmed the Stearman court's expansion of
Seely to cover damage to one part of a product caused by another part of the
same product.
8 9
C. Nevada Addresses Economic Loss
The clear trend toward finding additional consumer protection, an
approach exemplified by California and a number of other states,90 was
endorsed by the Nevada Legislature in 1995 with the passage of Nevada
Revised Statute 40.600 et seq. The statute mandates mediation of construction
defect disputes and clarifies and broadens damages a plaintiff/homeowner can
recover should mediation fail.9 ' The statute also allows for damages that are
clearly economic loss, including attorney's fees, relocation costs, and loss of
residence during repair. 92 However, the statute does not specify that such eco-
nomic loss can be recovered in tort, leaving the theory of relief to be decided by
the Nevada courts.9 3
In Nevada, economic loss doctrine was first explicitly invoked in Local
Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. Stern, wherein members of various
unions sued the architects of the original MGM Grand Hotel after the hotel was
closed following a devastating fire. 94 The unions alleged that the architect's
negligence caused the fire that forced the plaintiffs into unemployment, and
sued for lost wages and lost union dues resulting from their unemployment.9 5
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, the Nevada Supreme
Court cited Stevenson, holding that, absent privity of contract, a plaintiff cannot
84 Id. at 614.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 617.
87 Id. at 618.
88 Aas, 12 P.3d at 1135.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1147-49. Aas mentions Council of Co-owners v. Whiting, 517 A.2d 336 (Md.
1986); Oates v. Jag, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985); and Moransis v. Heathman, 744
So.2d 973 (Fla. 1999) as cases following California's approach.
91 Lynde Selden II, The New Nevada Construction Defect Statute: Changes in Form and
Substance, 3 NEVADA LAWYER 18, 20 (Nov. 1995).
92 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.655 (1997).
13 For conflicting views on Calloway's fidelity to NEV. REv. STAT. § 40, see Beasley, supra
note 16, and Menter et al., supra note 56, at 18.
94 651 P.2d 637 (Nev. 1982).
95 Id.
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recover for strictly economic loSS. 96 The court. found that the purpose of the
economic loss rule was to shield a defendant from unlimited liability for all of
the economic consequences of a negligent act, "particularly in a commercial or
professional setting."9 7
The court restated the central holding of Stern in a 1986 case, Central Bit
Supply v. Waldrop Drilling.9 8 Under circumstances strongly reminiscent of
Hadley v. Baxendale, Central Bit sought recovery for a defective drill bit that
broke during the drilling of a well. 99 The plaintiff sued on theories of warranty,
negligence, and strict liability to recover replacement costs of the drill, as well
as for consequential damages incurred because of the bit's failure, including
wages, lost time, and the travel necessary to procure a new bit.'0° The trial
court found for the plaintiff on all three theories, and assessed consequential
damages of $20,535.1o' The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the verdict on the
warranty theory, but took the opportunity to reiterate that a plaintiff may not
recover economic loss under theories of strict liability or negligence.
2
In Stern and Central Bit, the Nevada Supreme Court used privity and fore-
seeability to invoke economic loss doctrine in order to prevent the extension of
liability for consequential damages into virtually unlimited territory. In Stem,
there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant; as a result, the
defendant could not be held liable for consequential damages from the MGM
fire. In Central Bit, liability was limited because of the unforeseeable nature of
damages, although the court found that privity existed.
The court addressed the distinction between the legal duty owed in tort
and the specific contractual obligations of warranty in Charlie Brown Con-
struction v. Boulder City.1 °3 Brown and co-plaintiff Delta Corp. were subcon-
tractors who alleged that Boulder City was negligent in failing to enforce a
statute that the plaintiffs claimed required a payment bond to be posted by
contractors in public projects.1"4 The bond was not posted and the contractor
went bankrupt after the project was completed, leaving the subcontractors
unpaid. 105
The district court entered summary judgment for the City, but the Nevada
Supreme Court reversed, acknowledging that a municipality is not normally
held liable for failure to enforce an ordinance or statute (e.g., payment
bond). 106 However, the court distinguished the City's duty in this case, holding
that the ordinance created a special relationship between the City and the sub-
contractors that created a self-imposed duty on the City to protect the subcon-
tractors from the harm that the statute was specifically enacted to prevent.1 0
7
96 Id. at 411.
97 Id.
98 717 P.2d 35 (Nev. 1986).
99 Id.
100 Id.
lt Id. at 36.
102 Id.
103 797 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1990).
104 Id. at 947.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 950.
107 Id. at 950-51.
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The court distinguished the case from Stern 'and Central Bit by noting that
Brown and Delta were directly injured parties.' 0 8 It also addressed the City's
claim that the subcontractors suffered only economic loss. The court held that,
unlike in Central Bit and Stem, the plaintiffs were attempting to recover direct
damages, rather than consequential damages, and cited Stern for the proposi-
tion that the economic loss rule was designed to shield a defendant from unlim-
ited liability. 109 The court held that the economic loss rule is "bound up in
foreseeability" and the City's passage of a statute to protect against those losses
precluded the City from claiming that they were unforeseeable. 1"0 The court
did not reject the economic loss rule; rather, it held that the rule did not apply in
this particular case. The Nevada Supreme Court's reversal of the district court
was notable, however, for its willingness to find the City liable for negligence
arising by non-performance of an affirmative duty."'
The Nevada Supreme Court also wrestled with the property damage
dilemma in National Union v. Pratt & Whitney. 1 2 National Union was an
insurance company that insured a private airplane which subsequently crashed,
resulting in the destruction of the airplane but no personal injury." 3 Thereaf-
ter, National Union instituted a subrogation action against Pratt and Whitney,
alleging that the company negligently manufactured a defective engine that
caused the crash." 4 National Union contended that the engine damaged prop-
erty other than itself (namely the rest of the airplane) and, as such, tort liability
was justified.'' 5
The district court rejected National Union's argument, concluding that
economic loss doctrine required a finding of summary judgment for the defen-
dant." 6 The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, holding
that when a product "injures itself' recovery can best be accomplished in con-
tract remedies or by insurance, rather than tort.' 7 The court held that the air-
108 Id. at 952-53.
"09 Id.(citing Stem, 651 P.2d at 638).
11o Id. at 953.
111 This Case Note argues that Calloway should be reheard and reversed because economic
loss doctrine should not be applied to direct damages in construction defect cases. In addi-
tion, Calloway should also be reversed because of the Court's failure to hold the City of
Reno liable for negligent inspection. The Court held that, to be liable for negligence, plain-
tiffs must have alleged that the City failed to perform an affirmative duty, as in Charlie
Brown. The plaintiffs did allege just that and the Court's opinion notes that fact. Calloway
v. Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Nev. 2000). The Court's failure to address the issue could be
interpreted to mean that the City is immune from lawsuit for allowing a building to be
entered into the stream of commerce despite actual knowledge that it is not up to code.
Under that scenario, the Court overruled Charlie Brown and, without mention, three other
Nevada cases that hold municipalities and governmental agencies liable for certifying a
building, despite knowledge that it was negligently constructed. See Tahoe Village v. Doug-
las County, 799 P.2d 556 (Nev. 1990); Lotter v. Clark County, 739 P.2d 1320 (Nev. 1990);
Butler v. Bogdanovich, 705 P.2d 662 (Nev. 1985); see also Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1279
(Rose, C.J. dissenting).
112 815 P.2d 601 (Nev. 1991).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 602.
115 Id. at 603.
116 Id. at 602.
'17 Id. at 603.
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plane engine was an integrated part of the product, just as the defective turbine
was held to be part of the ship by the East River Court.
11 8
The court explained this holding by distinguishing National Union from
the 1983 ruling in Oak Grove v. Bell and Gossett."l9 In that case, Oak Grove
Investors purchased an apartment complex from another group and, shortly
after the purchase, discovered water damage from the plumbing and heating
system.1l 0 Alleging negligent design, manufacture, and installation, Oak
Grove filed suit against the manufacturer of the component part that caused the
problem. 121
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on numer-
ous grounds, none of which invoked economic loss doctrine, and the Nevada
Supreme Court reversed. 122 Bell and Gossett raised economic loss as a ground
on which to reject the appeal, and the court responded.' 23 As guidance to the
district court on remand, the court noted that the defective plumbing and heat-
ing system had caused damage throughout the complex. 124 Because property
damage was involved - and Oak Grove was not trying to recover strictly eco-
nomic loss - economic loss doctrine was inapplicable.
25
The court held in National Union that the Oak Grove property damage
was different than the damage to National Union's airplane, because the apart-
ment complex damaged in Oak Grove "consisted of a number of apartment
units that were self-contained and constructed for the separate occupancy of the
end users."' 126 The court invoked East River's position that all but the simplest
machines are made up of component parts, and that allowing tort recovery for
damage to such products would obliterate the distinction between tort and war-
ranty.127 In explaining this distinction, the court took a position in dictum that
would later encourage the Calloway plaintiffs: "[w]e deem it safe to conclude,
however, that economic loss doctrine was never intended to apply to construc-
tion projects that reflect the products and efforts of so many different manufac-
turers, laborers, crafts, supervisors, and inspectors in the creation of an
essentially permanent place of habitation."
1 28
In dissent, Justice Rose espoused a position similar to Stearman, that
property damage is recoverable in tort whether the property is "other property"
or the defective product itself.'2 9 The dissent asserted that economic loss
included "lost profits, lost productivity, lost wages, business expectations and
other losses that flow from the loss of the things damaged by the defective
product."' 13 However, the dissent asserted that economic loss does not include
118 Id. at 604.
119 668 P.2d 1075 (Nev. 1983).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1077.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1080.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1080-81.
126 National Union, 815 P.2d at 603.
127 Id. at 604.
128 Id. at 603.
129 Id. at 607 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
130 Id.
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property damage. 131 Justice Rose made no distinction between whether the
property was "other property" or the defective product itself. 132 He asserted
that Stern and Oak Grove made a clear distinction between economic loss and
property damage, and argued that making a distinction based on whether the
product was integrated with other personal property would lead to absurd
results. 1
33
By the mid-1990s, Nevada case law made it clear that the Nevada Court
would invoke economic loss doctrine to bar recovery for consequential dam-
ages, whether privity of contract existed (Central Bit) or not (Stem). In
National Union, the court invoked economic loss doctrine to bar recovery for
property damage in tort to any property but the actual deficient product, but
refused to apply the doctrine when damage caused by one small part of an
apartment complex was done to other property. In addition, the court suggested
in dicta that it would generally not apply economic loss doctrine to construction
defect cases.1
3 4
II. THE COURT DECIDES CALLOWAY
It was to this confused environment 135 that the homeowners in Calloway
brought their appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. The court had intimated
that economic loss did not apply to construction defect cases, and the only pure
construction defect case previously heard (Oak Grove) affirmed that judgment.
The appellants in Calloway sought to recover for physical property damage that
was allegedly caused by the negligent framing of their homes, rather than for
consequential damages that the court had refused to grant in the past.' 3 6 The
appellants, in order to fix their homes and avoid further damage, had been
forced to settle with the developer and contractor for less than their claim was
worth. 1 37 Since there were no other entities with which the homeowners had
privity of contract, the invocation of economic loss theory would leave the
homeowners with no recourse for full recovery, despite the presence of solvent
and culpable subcontractors.
13 8
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling of sum-
mary judgment and remanded. 139 The court once again noted the Stem find-
ing, which held that "[t]he primary purpose of the (economic loss) rule is to
shield a defendant from unlimited liability for all of the economic conse-
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. Chief Justice Rose wrote in dissent that "Such a rule would mean that a plaintiff
could recover for the loss of a million dollar airplane so long as the defect which destroyed
the plane also caused plaintiff to stub a toe." Id. (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 608 ("Although unnecessary to the analysis of this case, the majority opinion
states that the economic loss doctrine was never intended to apply to construction projects.")
(Rose, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
135 See Galloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1277. Chief Justice Rose describes the Court's prior deci-
sions as "neither consistent nor uniformly well reasoned."
136 id. at 1261-62.
137 Id. at 572.
138 Id.
139 Galloway 1, 939 P.2d at 1020.
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quences of a negligent act....,,14o In Calloway I, the court held that allowing
the appellants recovery for property damage did not violate the economic loss
rule because the defendant was subject only to liability that was readily foresee-
able.' 4 ' Additionally, the court limited the ruling to allow recovery only to
homeowners buying newly constructed homes who were unable to pursue tradi-
tional contract remedies. 1
42
The ruling gave homeowners protection from shoddy work and from con-
tractors who disappeared or filed bankruptcy upon completion of a project and
before latent defects could be discovered. 143 In this respect, Calloway I was a
logical extension of the national trend towards greater consumer protection pre-
saged by Kennedy in South Carolina and Stearman in California, and joined by
Nevada with the passage of Nevada Revised Statutes 40.600 et seq.
However, this apparent consumer victory was short lived. The Nevada
Supreme Court granted the City and subcontractors' petition for rehearing.'
44
On February 29, 2000, the court replaced its original opinion with a verdict that
a Calloway attorney characterized as "a 180 degree about-face."' 45 The court
withdrew its' Calloway I opinion, affirming the original district court ruling
and asserting that, despite its own National Union dictum, economic loss doc-
trine did indeed apply to construction defect cases. 146 The court embraced the
East River interpretation of the Seely holding, that mere economic harm caused
by a defective product cannot be recovered in tort.
14 7
The purpose of the ruling, according to the Nevada Supreme Court, was to
"preserve the law of warranty."' 48 However, the plaintiffs in Calloway had not
sought to overturn warranty law. Rather, they had attempted to exercise their
warranty option first, and sued in tort only because warranty remedies were
insufficient to make the plaintiffs whole. 149 In addition, the rule stated by Jus-
tice Rose in Calloway I specifically required warranty remedies to be pursued
and exhausted before tort could be considered.'
50
The court used the Seely decision selectively. It cited the Seely economic
loss language, but did not acknowledge that the holding was based on the find-
ing that, despite physical injury to property being akin to personal injury, the
product in question showed no defect that caused the physical damage to prop-
erty. 5 ' The Seely Court wrote that "[c]ourts of this state have fully examined
the economic loss rule, drawn the line of demarcation between such loss and
physical injury to property, including to the defective product itself, and
140 Id. at 1025.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1026.
143 Id. at 1025.
144 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1259.
'45 Diana Sahagun, High Court Ruling Limits Homeowners' Options, LAS VEGAS SUN,
April 2, 2000.
146 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1266.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Calloway 1, 993 P.2d at 1025.
15 Id. at 1026.
151 Seely, 403 P.2d at 145.
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allowed recovery of strict liability damages in the latter instance."1 5 2 Given
that holding, and the subsequent California decisions based upon it, the Nevada
Supreme Court misrepresented California construction defect law.
The court further differentiated between tort and contract by viewing con-
tract law as designed to enforce standards of quality while tort law was viewed
as designed to protect safety. 15 3 This narrow reading of the purposes driving
tort law ignores the idea that, in applying penalties for failure to make a safe
product, tort law also contributes to product quality.1 54 Under the facts of Cal-
loway, even assuming the defectively framed homes had caused solely eco-
nomic damage, it can hardly be denied that liability for defective framing
would help assure safety by improving standards of construction.
In asserting the economic loss rule, the court leaned heavily on the corner-
stones of the rule: the need to protect a manufacturer from unlimited liability
and the need for manufacturers to be able to foresee their potential liability.
The court wrote that "[p]ermitting plaintiffs to recover in tort for purely eco-
nomic losses would result in open-ended liability, since it is virtually impossi-
ble to predict all the economic consequences of a given act."'
155
This may be true in some situations, but it was not true in Calloway. The
plaintiffs did not ask for unlimited liability against the subcontractors. Rather,
they asked only direct damages for the loss caused by the subcontractors' negli-
gent work. 156 The Court's insistence on finding a distinction between tort and
contract, based on limits to liability, posits a false dilemma. Just as contract
theory has its Hadley v. Baxendale to limit liability, tort law has its own version
of limited liability, as expounded in Palsgraf v. Long Island RR.157 Palsgraf
limits liability for negligence to reasonably foreseeable consequences, precisely
what proponents of economic loss in construction defect cases advocate, and
opponents insist is impossible in tort.
158
Clearly, the losses in Calloway were foreseeable. The subcontractors
knew that people would move into the homes they framed, and that defective
framing could cause damage to the homes. The cost of fixing water damage to
the homes is also fairly easy to estimate. In excluding tort liability, Calloway II
perpetuates a mechanistic intonation of rule without regard for the facts of the
case or the plight of the damaged parties.
The court also attempted to distinguish damages in Oak Grove, National
Union, and Calloway to support their revised decision in Calloway I. The
court began by rejecting its own construction defect dictum from National
Union by insisting that the National Union case had nothing to do with con-
struction. 159 The court held in National Union that economic loss was suitable
for inclusion within the economic loss rule because it was not a construction
152 Id.
153 Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1265.
154 See Aas, 12 P.3d at 1153-54 (George, C.J., dissenting).
155 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1266.
156 Calloway 1, 939 P.2d at 1025-26.
151 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
158 Id. at 104.
159 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1265.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
case. 160 On the other hand, the court held that it did not invoke economic loss
in Oak Grove because "it did not involve a single integrated product that
injured itself."16 1
The Court's inconsistency on the subject of economic loss is understanda-
ble, given the narrow distinctions upon which the economic loss rule is predi-
cated. In National Union, the damage was to a crane caused by defective bolts
on the crane. In Oak Grove, it was to apartments caused by a heating and
plumbing system common to all units, but owned by none. In Calloway, the
damage was to numerous, freestanding homes in a planned development. The
out-of-state cases include cars injured by a component part, manufactured
homes injured by a defective foundation, and other homes with defective
components.
The decisions on economic loss frequently hinge on the court's interpreta-
tion of whether the defective part was an integrated part of the product and
whether the damage was the result of the product "injuring itself' or being
injured by another distinct part. In Calloway, the argument hinged on whether
damage to the homes caused by defective framing could be imputed to the
subcontractor, or if only the builder and/or developer could be held responsible
for the entire product, e.g., the home.
The confusion inherent for builders, developers, subcontractors, and
homeowners is easily seen, as is the potential for absurdity created through
attempts to make economic loss doctrine fit modem construction realities.
Consider a situation in which an upstairs condominium in a duplex is defec-
tively framed. Water damage destroys both condominium homes and contract
remedy is unavailable, due to contractor bankruptcy. Under the economic loss
rule, the framing subcontractor would likely be liable for damage to the home
that was not negligently framed (because it did not "injure itself' - the damage
was done by an external force) and not liable for the home in which the shoddy
work was actually done. To further exacerbate the absurdity of this result, if
both homes were defectively framed, then the downstairs unit's owner is no
longer able to seek a remedy against the subcontractor. This means that the
subcontractor has less liability by doing more negligent work!
In order to alleviate the confusion and ameliorate the obvious unfairness
of the economic loss doctrine, the Nevada Supreme Court should take the next
opportunity to reject the economic loss rule in construction defect cases. It
should allow recovery of direct damage from negligent builders in warranty or
tort at the option of the homeowner.
160 National Union, 815 P.2d at 603. It can be argued that National Union was indeed a
case analogous with construction issues. The similarity between the component part of an
airplane and the way that homes are currently constructed, by numerous subcontractors
doing the framing, masonry, carpentry and various other tasks, is obvious.
161 Calloway I, 993 P.2d at 1268.
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III. "WE'D ALL LOVE TO SEE THE PLANS": A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
While consumers need a fair resolution to the tension between tort and
contract remedies for construction defects, "we'd all love to see the plans.' 6 2
Moreover, it is important that the resolution be based on the right plan.
In a future case, the court could reverse Calloway on grounds as basic as
argument by analogy to Oak Grove. In Oak Grove, the plumbing system
caused damage to numerous units and the court held that the plumbing system
harmed "other property" - the units themselves.' 63 In Calloway II, the major-
ity misapprehends the nature of townhomes, finding that the framing was an
integral component of the various homes, meaning that the homes damaged
only themselves and not other property." However, in townhouses, the fram-
ing is not only integral to the homes but it is also common to all yet owned by
none, as was the case with the plumbing in Oak Grove. The court could rea-
sonably rule for the plaintiffs without disturbing (or clarifying) current Nevada
economic loss doctrine. However, such a narrow ruling would simply leave
this battle to be fought on another field, with all parties to construction transac-
tions left in limbo during the interim. Public policy concerns dictate that some
method of relief be established for litigants such as the Calloway plaintiffs.
Failing to do so encourages negligent construction that can cause serious injury
and financial ruin to homeowners.' 65
On the other hand, the concerns expressed by the majority in Calloway II
appear legitimate. A poorly crafted rule could indeed allow for recovery in
virtually all circumstances for consequential damages1 66 and bring to fruition
East River's famous prediction, that contract law could drown in a sea of
tort. 167 In Calloway I, the court decided for the plaintiffs on narrowly crafted
grounds. There, the court hastened to point out that it was not overturning the
economic loss doctrine for other tort scenarios, but solely in "situations in
which relief is sought by original purchasers of newly constructed homes who
cannot pursue traditional contract remedies .... 6
The majority in the second Calloway opinion properly criticized this plan
as resulting in "outcome determinative decisions that may have no analytical
162 The Beatles, Revolution (Apple Records 1968).
163 There does seem to be some disagreement within the court on this point. In Calloway II,
the majority wrote "[O]ak Grove did not involve a single integrated product that 'injured
itself."' Calloway H1, 993 P.2d at 1268. However, Justice Maupin wrote of Oak Grove,
"Thus, a completed entity that 'injured itself' caused 'property damage,' taking the case out
of the economic loss doctrine." Id. at 1274 (Maupin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
164 Id. at 1269.
165 Aas, 24 Cal. 4th at 668-69; Stearman, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 615 (repairs to the home
estimated at $260,000).
'66 See Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc, 207 A.2d 305, 310-11 (N.J. 1965), where the court held
that a purchaser of defective carpet could sue in tort for economic loss even when plaintiff's
only claim was for the loss of value of the carpeting. See also J'aire v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d
799 (1979) (plaintiff sued when a contractor negligently delayed construction, causing plain-
tiff to incur business losses).
167 East River, 476 U.S. at 866.
168 Calloway 1, 939 P.2d at 1026.
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consistency."' 69 The Rose plan, while providing equitable relief to aggrieved
plaintiffs, would muddy the economic loss doctrine's use in Nevada even fur-
ther, leaving future plaintiffs unsure of where the line is drawn.' 70 It would
also leave unresolved the issues of whether a product that injures itself falls
under economic loss doctrine, and whether a plaintiff can recover before actual
damage occurs. Under current Nevada economic loss doctrine, plaintiffs that
have not yet experienced property damage due to defective construction must
wait until they actually suffer injury or physical property damage in order to
recover for negligent construction. ' 7 1 Waiting for such damage to occur could
itself be catastrophic for homeowner and contractor alike.' 7 2
Any plan to roll back the draconian restrictions of the economic loss doc-
trine must take into account primary conflicts presented by the tension between
contract and tort recovery theories. A proper plan should forbid tort recovery
for consequential damages in order to avoid contract remedies being subsumed
by tort law. It should allow for recovery for physical damage to a home caused
by a negligently constructed portion of the home and for recovery of repair
costs for negligent construction that has not yet caused damage, but poses a
potential danger to the homeowner.
In California, the leading case of Biakanja v. Irving imposes tort liability
upon suppliers of negligently made goods and services that are reasonably cer-
tain to place life and limb in peril, even where the only foreseeable risk is
damage to tangible property.' 7 3 In addition, liability may be found without
regard to privity between the parties. 174 The liability determination is made as
a matter of policy and involves the balancing of six factors: (1) the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability
of harm; (3) the degree of certainty of injury; (4) the closeness of connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.'7 5
Within California's approach, the foreseeability concerns of the Calloway
majority are addressed in points (1) and (2). In addition, concerns about limit-
ing liability are addressed in point (4). Finally, point (6) would help alleviate
the current problems that arise from the need under the present policy to wait
for actual, physical damage to occur before rectifying problems due to defec-
tive construction. At first blush, therefore, California's Biakanja approach
portends to provide an acceptable solution to this issue.
Unfortunately, direct application of the Biakanja doctrine in Nevada
would threaten to open the floodgates of tort litigation. In the subsequent Cali-
fornia decision of J'aire v. Gregory, a contractor entered into an agreement
with the county of Sonoma to do airport construction work, including improve-
169 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1266 n.3.
170 It should here be noted that the plan criticized by the Calloway H majority is more
universal than the one that gained court acceptance in Calloway L Chief Justice Rose's
expands his position in Calloway H to allow a choice of contract and tort remedies to all
construction defect plaintiffs.
171 Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1279 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
172 See Aas, 24 Cal. 4th at 673.
173 320 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1958).
174 Id.
171 Id. at 19.
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ments to a restaurant operated at the airport by a private party in a lease
arrangement. 176 The lessee sued for lost profits and loss of business, arguing
that the construction shut down his restaurant for an unreasonable period of
time due to the contractor's negligent failure to finish in a timely manner.
177
The J'aire Court allowed recovery for these strictly consequential dam-
ages based on the Biakanja factors.1 78 It held that, when negligent conduct
does damage to property, the plaintiff may recover for lost profits. 179 A plain-
tiff may do so even when only injury to prospective economic advantage is
involved. 8 0
Under the Biakanja/J'aire doctrine, issues that are clearly economic in
nature, arising within a contractual relationship between the parties in privity,
would be decided in tort. This doctrine would swallow up the limited liability
concerns expressed by the Calloway majority. In J'aire, the contractor was
held liable for the interruption of heat and air conditioning services that were
promised to the lessee in the lease agreement. Theoretically, following the
J'aire approach, a contractor would have to be aware of all contractual obliga-
tions of the owner with any lessees in order to determine the contractor's poten-
tial liability.
A better, more subjective method for assessing tort liability in construction
defect cases comes from the South Carolina case of Kennedy v. Columbia Lum-
ber, which ushered in a construction defect law regime in that state that is
based on the builder's activity itself, rather than on the consequences of the
activity. 18 1 In Kennedy, respondent Columbia Lumber supplied building
materials to a construction company for use in building a home.' 8 2 The con-
struction company experienced financial difficulties, and Columbia took a deed
in lieu of foreclosure, and subsequently sold the house.'8 3 When a defective
foundation caused cracks in the house, the buyer, Kennedy, sued Columbia.'8 4
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict for Columbia
on the grounds that Columbia was only a materials supplier turned lender, and
that neither material suppliers nor lenders were liable for construction
defects. 185 The court then used the case as an opportunity to generally examine
construction defect liability in South Carolina. It noted that the state's law had
evolved over the years to adjust to changing economic realities, and opined that
it was once again time for a new approach.18 6 The court overruled Carolina
Winds and established both implied warranty liability 87 and tort liability for
non-seller builders. 188
176 598 P.2d at 62 (Cal. 1979).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 803-04.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
182 Id. at 732.
183 Id. at 732-33.
184 Id. at 733.
185 Id. at 733-34.
186 Id. at 735.
187 Id. at 736.
188 Id. at 737.
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The Kennedy Court disagreed with Carolina Winds, which held that par-
ties in privity are restricted to warranty remedies. Instead, the Kennedy Court
held that a builder may not escape warranty liability simply because it was not
also the seller.189 The court noted that it had been a participant in chipping
away at the privity defense and wrote that its Kennedy decision should "still all
whispers of its continued existence." 9 °
Further, the Kennedy Court examined the economic loss doctrine's appli-
cability to tort liability. The court found that the prototypical economic loss
scenario, in which a purchaser had tort remedies only when the product is
defective and causes physical harm, generated difficulty because the scenario
focuses on consequence rather than action. 1 ' This allowed equally blamewor-
thy builders to be treated differently based solely on whether the harm was
discovered early enough to avoid physical harm. 
192
The Kennedy Court chose to allow contract and/or tort remedies based on
the activity of the builder, rather than on the consequence of the builder's
actions."' It held that builders owe a legal duty to an original purchaser to
protect against diminution in the expected value of the building, and that a
violation of a building code is a breach of the builder's legal duty for which the
builder can be held liable in tort.' 9 4 The court left no doubt that it was remov-
ing economic loss doctrine as a defense for non-seller home builders in South
Carolina:
We are persuaded that building a house which one knows or should know will later
be sold by a party to an innocent buyer is an act adequate to constitute placing that
house into the stream of commerce. Any builder who violates such a duty should
justly be held accountable for the losses that his breach caused, whether they be
physical harm or the diminution of value of the house. 195
In conclusion, the Kennedy Court established three instances in which
builders could be held liable in tort to a home buyer. The builder is liable if the
builder violates an applicable building code, deviates from industry standards,
or has constructed housing that "he knows or should know will pose serious
risks of physical harm."' 96 The court's plan holds builders responsible in tort
when they violate legal duties, but retains economic loss doctrine in situations
where the only duty breached is contractual. 197
The application of this plan would have allowed for relief in Calloway.
The builder would have been liable for framing that failed to meet building
codes and deviated from industry standards. It would have allowed the home-
owners to recover for the damage done by the rain and snow, and to have their
homes repaired so as to prevent possible physical harm resulting from leakage.
Furthermore, it would avoid the Carolina Winds court's fear that builders
189 Id. at 736.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 737.
194 Id. at 736.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 738.
197 Id. at 737.
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would be subject to nebulous damages of an indeterminate amount based on
possible physical harm that has not yet occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nevada continues to be the fastest growing state in the nation. The incen-
tive for builders to build quickly creates an inevitable temptation to cut comers.
A system of jurisprudence that allows builders knowledgeable in home con-
struction to escape liability for negligent performance, while placing the onus
on the unknowledgeable home buyer, impedes the public policy that homes
should be safe and fulfill their purpose.
The economic loss doctrine is a judicial creation that Nevada can adopt or
reject, depending on what is deemed to best serve Nevada. 9 ' It can hardly be
thought that what "best serves Nevada" is a system that leaves homeowners
without remedy to obvious wrong. A mechanistic reading of the economic loss
doctrine better serves tradition than it does the modem interests and exigencies
of Nevada. That formalistic reading should be rejected in favor of recovery for
direct damage in home construction defect cases.
The Nevada Supreme Court failed to provide this important consumer pro-
tection in its Calloway holding. However, the sharply divided final opinion
and the original Calloway I opinion send a clear message that the court is still
open to change in this area of the law.199 Since the Calloway H ruling, the
Nevada Supreme Court has expanded from five to seven members. This modi-
fied court dynamic might result in a different decision if the court were to apply
economic loss doctrine on slightly different facts. 2" In the long and winding
road that is construction defect economic loss doctrine, a change could - and
should - come. The Nevada Supreme Court need only "let it be."
198 Id. at 1279 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
199 See generally Menter et al., supra note 56, at 21.
200 Id.
